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In 1998-1999 Brazil suffered from a financial crisis. Its currency, the Real, collapsed in 1999. The International Monetary Fund came to the rescue.

It is not universally accepted that the International Monetary Fund, henceforth referred to as IMF, always has the compatible answer to a crisis, and is the perfect manager of the world’s financial economy. A lot of criticism of the institution has been and is being expressed. In this thesis I shall discuss whether the criticism can also be applied to the IMF’s handling of the financial crisis Brazil suffered in 1999. I shall try to answer the question whether the IMF had the answer to the Brazilian crisis in 1999.  

The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 will introduce the International Monetary Fund. I shall deal with its history, its policies and how these policies are executed. The emphasis will be on crisis-prevention, as this is the IMF’s core business, and conditionality, since this is subject to one of the criticisms discussed later on. An assessment of the IMF will be included in this chapter, since the IMF has endured much criticism in its 62 years of existence. 
In chapter 2 the Brazilian history leading to the crisis will be described. Emphasis will be on the Real Plan, a plan to combat the inflation Brazil had suffered from for decades. A plan also, that contributed to the unsustainable situation that in part led to the currency crash. 
Chapter 3 will contain the case of the Brazilian crisis as well as the answer to this by the IMF and the role of the IMF in this crisis.







1944, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, United States. 45 governments meet to discuss a framework for international economic co-operation. With the experience of the Great Depression in mind they agreed to work together to make sure such disastrous policies, which contributed to the Great Depression, would not repeat themselves. The result: the International Monetary Fund was born in December 1945, when 29 governments signed the Articles of Agreement. Today the IMF has 184 member countries (IMF, n.d.).
1.1 International economic co-operation 
The international economic co-operation has changed shape through time. In this chapter I shall describe how the IMF has intended to accomplish effective cooperation in different periods of time. 
1.1.1 1945-1971
Between 1945 and 1971 one of the most important agreements the countries made was to fix their exchange rates. A country’s currency would be pegged to the U.S. dollar and the U.S. dollar would then be pegged to gold. The only reason to adjust the rates was in order to fix a ‘fundamental equilibrium’ and only with the IMF’s consent. This system is also known as the Bretton Woods system. After the war European and Japanese economies recovered and wanted to run surpluses which shifted the large official settlements balance in the United States into a deficit. The gold reserves fell and it was questioned whether the dollar was really worth as much gold as had been established. The United States had three options: 1. Shrink the economy; 2. impose tight exchange controls; 3. devaluate the dollar. March 17, 1968 they opted for changing the rules and in a meeting with seven countries a two-tier system was introduced, letting all but seven currencies float in response to supply and demand. The payment deficits continued and in August 1971 the United States again opted for loosening the rules even more. The Bretton Woods system effectively ended and was officially abandoned in 1973. From then on countries could choose their own system of exchange (Pugel, 2004: 506).
1.1.2 Today
Today the IMF defines its tasks as involving three areas: surveillance, technical assistance and loans, all supported by research and statistics. Surveillance means monitoring economic and financial developments and the provision of policy advice. The main aim of this task is crisis-prevention, in which the surveillance can serve as an early warning. How the IMF’s core business became crisis-prevention will be described in 1.2.2.
Technical assistance means ‘helping countries build up their human and institutional capacity to design and implement effective macro-economic and structural policies, put in place reforms that strengthen their financial sectors, and reduce vulnerability to crises’ (IMF, n.d.). Providing technical assistance not only helps the country itself, but it also contributes to a more stable global economy. 
Providing loans is a core responsibility of the IMF. The Fund provides loans to countries, which have balance of payment problems, so that they can rebuild their international reserves, stabilize their currencies, keep buying import-products, and make sure economic growth can occur. One of the main reasons the IMF provides loans specifically to those countries suffering from balance of payment problems is that balance of payment problems can result in crises. (This will be discussed in the next section). Therefore crises can also be prevented by IMF loans (IMF, n.d.). 
As can be noticed, all three areas contain a very important element: they all try to prevent crises. In other words, the international economic co-operation in the image of the IMF contains as a continuous thread through its policy: crisis-prevention. 
1.2 Crisis-prevention
A core responsibility of the IMF is crisis-prevention. Through surveillance, technical assistance and loans they try to accomplish this. Preventing crises is important for a stable global economy, one of the main aims of the Fund. In general the IMF assists countries in restoring economic stability by offering programs for corrective policies and providing the U.S. dollars necessary to support these in the shape of loans.
In this section, I shall explain the concept of a financial crisis. The emphasis is on the external crisis as the case-study in the following sections was an external crisis. First, the birth of the role of the IMF as crisis manager is described. 
1.2.1 The birth of a crisis manager
The IMF’s core responsibility came into being at the time of the international debt crisis, 1982-1989. The debt crisis of the 1980s erupted when the major international banks ceased lending and attempted to stop rolling over existing credits to a large number of economically troubled developing countries. (Boughton, 2000) Starting in Eastern Europe in 1981 and the first half of 1982, it globalised after reaching Latin America. 
What was the difference between this crisis and earlier balance of payments crises? As Mexico exemplifies, the IMF introduced a new solution to solve the Mexican debt crisis (Boughton, 2000). The IMF would normally estimate the total amount of financing required and determine the appropriate amount for the Fund. If the balance of payment appeared likely to be forthcoming from other creditors, the IMF would approve the arrangement. In the debt crisis this procedure failed as other international creditors were not willing to fill the gap. The IMF decided on offering Mexico a loan on the condition that Mexico increased exposure of its banks, as this was the collective interest of international creditors (Boughton, 2000).
Why did the IMF accept this role of crisis manager? First of all there is the problem that highly indebted developing countries would otherwise have to default and this default poses a threat to the borrowers and the international financial system. Secondly, taking on new debts was indeed a sound economic strategy if done on appropriate terms and in conjunction with reforms in macro-economic policies. The financing and the reforms then could only be obtained with multilateral intervention (Boughton, 2000).
The lending the IMF introduced at that time appeared to be unviable after some time. Other, similar plans were undertaken, but it was the Brady plan of March 1989 which provided the political support for multilateral action to reduce debt overhang (a form of overlending and overborrowing as will be described in the next section).
Since the debt-crisis of 1982-1989 the IMF has been learning to deal with crises; most elements of crisis-prevention and solving crisis have been in place since then. Hence, when the Asian crisis hit in 1997, the Russian crisis in 1998 and the Brazilian crisis in 1998-1999, the IMF was prepared. 
1.2.2 What is a financial crisis?
A financial crises can be internal or external. An internal financial crisis occurs when citizens of a country try to get hold of their savings by pulling all their money out of the banks. Banks then run short of money for investments and may not be able to service their debt. When banks default (cannot repay) a banking crisis occurs. An external financial crisis occurs when foreign investors - caused by several possible factors - try to pull out their money simultaneously and the country can either not pay back what it owes, or gets stuck in a crisis when it does try to pay back. 
You can compare a financial crisis with establishing several companies at the same time. You yourself do not have the capital, but because you offer a certain interest rate, investors will chip in for the capital needed. For any reason (the factors will be explained later on) all of a sudden a big investor wants his money back. Two possible scenarios will unfold: 1. you will not be able to pay back your debt and will be stuck trying to pay back for a very long time. 2. You will have to sell everything you own, fire all your employees and you will have to live in severe distress to pay your debt. In the global world of foreign investment the person with the several companies is the country and the big investors are several foreign investors from all over the world, usually the rich western world. 
As explained in box 1.1 on page 9, foreign investment has an overall positive impact. Why and how then do external financial crises occur? According to Pugel (2004: 533) five major factors can lead to financial crises: 1. Waves of overlending and overborrowing. 2. Exogenous international shocks. 3. Fickle international short-term lending. 4. Exchange rate risk. 5. Global contagion. All will be explained briefly now.
1.	Waves of overlending and overborrowing. 
Excessively expansionary government policies in the borrowing country are the main explanation for overlending and overborrowing. The government tends to lend more and more to pay for its expansionary policies and fill up the growing budget deficit. To finance the growing current account deficit it guarantees loans to private borrowers. When the government realizes it has borrowed too much, it may default. Overlending and overborrowing to private borrowers can also result in a situation in which both realize it has been too much.
2.	Exogenous international shocks
In the case of exogenous international shocks, lenders and borrowers reassess their investments and the borrowers’ ability to repay. When the world price of the country’s key export product drops, the country may default. This is an incentive for lenders to pull out their money all at once.
3.	Fickle international short-term lending
Short-term lending is problematic for the borrowing country if it shifts in equilibrium. Any shift can be an incentive for the investors to not refinance the loan. This means that at any time, when it suits the investor he can ask his money back. It may well occur that all investors request this at once.






When an exchange rate is fixed, financial institutions may act as in figure 1.1, when the interest rate of the local currency (in this case the yen) is higher. 

Figure 1.1 Behaviour of financial institutions, when an exchange rate is fixed


When speculations or expectations of the likelihood of a devaluation of the local currency becomes noticeable, all investor will want their borrowers to pay them back now, so they can exchange the local currency into dollars before it is too late. This will make it even more difficult for the government to keep its exchange rate fixed. The institutions then may default their foreign loans (in dollars) as foreign loans will become more difficult to obtain and the old loans will want repayment at once.The likelihood of devaluation may be expected or speculated, when for example the country suffers from a balance of payment problem. According to Krugman a balance of payment problem due to the defence of a currency will lead to a flee of investors, when it becomes clear that the country is running out of foreign reserves. The country will then become the victim of a speculative attack; investors pull out their money and the currency value will depreciate, unless other reserves (of which the investors were not aware) are used to defend the exchange rate (Krugman, 1979).
5.	Global contagion
One reason for global contagion may simply be herding. When investors pull out their money in one country other investors may overreact and demand their loans to be repaid in other parts of the world. It may also be the case that a particular financial crisis shows certain real problems that contributed to the financial crisis, problems that can be found in other countries as well. A financial crisis then serves as an early warning and makes investors pull out their money causing a financial crisis elsewhere. A combination or sequence of the two is also possible (Pugel, 2004: 537).
1.2.2 The IMF solution
Of course it is an illusion to think that the IMF can undo the financial crisis, if lending shrinks and scrambling begins, the IMF has no power to stop this. Still a country can be helped by the IMF: the IMF can provide a loan at a very minimal interest rate of 0.5%. This gives the country room to breathe and therefore to implement adjustment policies and reforms to overcome the crisis and create conditions for strong and sustainable growth, employment, and social investment (IMF n.d.). 
In the case of a sudden drop of the world price of the country’s key export product (factor 2 above), the loan can ease the pain and serve as a bridge for the time the country must wait for the price to get to its old level. If the price is not likely to recover the loan can ease the pain of otherwise harsh adjustments. A country suffering from capital flight, caused by a loss of confidence, uses the loan to address the problem that led to this drop of confidence. 
1.3 Conditionality
The question arises whether every member country can receive a loan, whenever it knocks on the Fund’s door. This is not the case. The government knocking on the door and the Fund must first agree on a program of economic policies. This in order to make sure that the loan will be used properly to serve its goal, viz.  resolving the balance of payment problem. 
1.3.1 Why conditions and which?
As mentioned above the main reason for the conditions is the accomplishment of the solution. The balance of payment problem either before, during ór after a financial crisis, must be solved. This is not only positive for the country but for the Fund as well; it enables the country to repay the fund. To diminish the so-called moral hazard (poor policy measures, because the IMF will bail out anyway) the conditions are also the terms on which the IMF will continue to provide financial assistance. 
Next to solving the immediate problem the IMF also provides conditions for sustainability and economic growth for the longer term. These conditions include measures to contain inflation, reduce public debt or strengthen financial systems all to achieve broader economic stability (IMF n.d.). To address structural impediments to healthy growth price and trade liberalization or improvements in governance can be conditions as well.
All these policies together are a country’s policy program, which is described in a letter of intent that accompanies the country’s request for IMF financing. The letter of intent contains the overarching goal in all cases; to restore or maintain balance of payments viability and macro-economic stability, while setting the stage for sustained, high-quality growth.
1.3.2 How is compliance assessed?
The majority of the loans provided by the IMF feature phased disbursement. This means that the loan is not provided for at once, but phased. In this manner the IMF may stop its loan, which reduces the moral hazard as discussed above, and can monitor compliance. The tools used for monitoring are (IMF n.d.): 
1.	Prior actions; actions a country must take in order to get the loan at all. These actions may include adjustment of the exchange rate to a sustainable level.
2.	Performance criteria; specific conditions that have to be met for the agreed amount of credit to be disbursed (IMF). Two different performance criteria can be distinguished.
a.	Quantitative performance criteria; macro-economic policy.
b.	Structural performance criteria; structural measures that are critical to the success of the economic program. For example restructure key sectors such as energy. 
3.	Indicative targets; these may supplement the performance criteria. They are often set for later on in the program and when they approach, they become performance criteria.
4.	Structural benchmarks; small steps or measures that cannot be monitored objectively.
5.	Program review; a broad-based assessment, which can result in changes in the program or deletion of certain performance criteria. 
1.4 An assessment of IMF policy 
Over the years the IMF has been the object of affection, hate and everything in between. Some scientists, journalists and economists applaud the IMF policies, others criticise them. In the next section the main criticisms of the IMF are discussed.
1.4.1 Higher interest rates do not defend the exchange rate
The first criticism discussed here is by Jason Furman and Joseph Stiglitz and dates from 1998. Their main argument is that the response to a currency crisis as applied in Asia 1997 and Brazil 1998-1999, is not the universal answer. It consists of raising interest rates in order to keep attracting foreign investors, who in that way will finance the deficit in the balance of payment. According to them the success of raising interest rates depends on certain conditions and cannot be applied everywhere to achieve the same results. 
Furman and Stiglitz attack the theory that a higher interest rate today results in a higher exchange rate level and a permanently stronger exchange rate. The general assumption lays in the following equation:

where e is the local currency per unit of foreign currency, i is the interest rate, * is the foreign variable and E the expectation. An increase in i would lead to a higher value on the left side of the equation calling for a higher value on the right side of the equation. A higher expected exchange rate will contribute to this higher value on the right side. It can therefore be concluded that according to this equation a higher interest rate will indeed lead to an appreciation of the local currency. 
Furman and Stiglitz, however, present several difficulties concerning this model. First, monetary policy can influence the expected exchange rate as well. A lowering of price levels or lower inflation will contribute to the appreciation of the currency; higher prices or higher inflation will contribute to the depreciation of the currency. On the other hand a lack of confidence can weaken the exchange rate. Secondly, a nominal increase of the interest rate may lead to a decrease of the expected interest rate, which is realistic to expect in developing countries. In developing countries it may well be expected that investors will not be confident that the high rates are sustainable, as in their eyes the developing country is a relatively unstable one. Therefore, they will expect the high interest rate to drop soon, which will lead them not to invest at all. Finally, the market may be risk averse. If you put the latter two problems into the equation where δ is the probability of bankruptcy and v is the risk premium, it can be seen that if both variables increase the currency will depreciate.

Furthermore Furman and Stiglitz present six effects that the rise of interest rates may have on an economy: 1. The effect of contraction by debtors outlasts the increase in interest rates. 2. The higher probability of default results in capital flight. 3. New companies will not be easy to start as other go bankrupt. 4. The moral hazard with a bankruptcy law will result in more bankruptcies. When you know there is a way out, your policies may change; when interest rates are raised and you find your net worth compromised, with a bankruptcy law gambling may be chosen. 5. Caused by the many bankruptcies credit availability drops. 6. The lack of accurate information reduces the ability to make the right decisions (for further elaboration on these issues see Furman and Stiglitz).
All these effects together cause a leftward shift in the supply curve and then the demand curve, in effect leading to less economic activity. The unemployment rate will rise and will further lower demand. As bankruptcy is common, the demand for investment will drop and pushes more firms into bankruptcy. 
Hence, the authors conclude that a higher interest rate will not automatically lead to a stronger exchange rate and may even lead to a weaker exchange rate. The IMF’s answer to a financial crisis may therefore sometimes worsen the crisis or even set it off. 
1.4.2 Means and ends do not coincide 
Geoffrey Sachs, Stephen Radelet, Richard Cooper and Barry Bosworth (1998) present an ample vision on the IMF’s solution for the Asian crisis criticising the answers given by the IMF. The bail-outs the IMF provided for Indonesia, Thailand and Korea are the subject of the critique, which can be summarized as follows:
1.	In order to restore market confidence in the short term the IMF is not the institution to provide this. ‘Its arrival gives all the confidence of seeing an ambulance outside one's door’ (Sachs et al., 1998).
2.	The IMF worsened the situation of panic amongst creditors by declaring that the crisis was the result of deep fundamental weaknesses. 
3.	The main hypothesis which served as the basis for the whole program was rather curious. The hypothesis was that tough action on restructuring financial markets would restore confidence. This may indeed cause panic rather than soothe it. 
4.	The fiscal contraction and high interest rates as fiscal and monetary approach failed to achieve the confidence needed. Countries being hit hard by the withdrawal of foreign credits will only be hit harder by fiscal contraction (see box 1.2 on page 14). 
This is especially curious as there is no evidence that a fiscal surplus implies confidence in a market. In their argument that raising interest rates may not stabilize the exchange rate in a crisis situation, Sachs et al. follow the argument as presented by Furman and Stiglitz. 
5.	The image the IMF claims to have of a lender of last resort is in reality a vague shadow. Announcing large sums of money, but not having them readily available will very unlikely stop the creditors from wanting to pull out their money. 
6.	The IMF was too optimistic that lending would be rolled over as soon as they were in the picture.
7.	The initial loans provided were not presented to the public, hence they did not restore confidence and made sure creditors would no longer run.
8.	Many structural reforms covering a wide range of policies beyond the immediate crisis were only distracting. They took government expertise, negotiating time and political capital away from the core problem (Sachs et al., 1998). I shall return to this issue when I discuss the critique presented by Martin Feldstein (1998)

Box 1.2 Fiscal contraction with fixed exchange rates (Pugel, 2004: 593) 


To conclude, Sachs et al. claim that the IMF policy goal should be ‘to support long-term capital flows especially foreign direct investment - and equity portfolio flows, but mainly to limit short-term international flows to the financing of short term trade transactions.’ (Sachs et al., 1998). The limiting of short-term lending is profitable, because one of the dangers for a financial crisis is indeed short-term lending as explained above (1.2.2). The main problem found while analysing IMF policy is that they pushed Asian countries toward more capital market liberalization in the wake of the crisis. No distinction was made between short-term and long-term capital flows. The consequence was that, amongst many of the creditors who made a run for their money, causing the crisis, were short-term creditors. 
In sum, it can be said that the intentions the IMF had were not accomplished by the policy they used. The means did not coincide with the ends. 
1.4.3 The new raison d’être
According to Martin Feldstein (1998) the IMF was forced to find a new raison d’être after the collapse in 1971. This new role was found in the 1980s when the IMF helped many Latin American countries in the international debt crisis as described above (1.2.1). The problem in the Latin American debt crisis was a problem of liquidity; the countries were temporarily unable to pay their debts. In order to earn more foreign exchange by net-exporting they raised taxes, cut government spending and tightened credit. As the problem was temporary this strategy worked and Latin American countries recovered. 
The next situation, when the IMF felt it was called to the rescue, was the shift of Eastern European countries from communism to a market economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The IMF was practically the only provider of advice they listened to, because it was bringing substantial rewards to the countries that accepted the advice, even though much of its advice was controversial. 
The next chapter was Asia. During the Asian crisis the IMF acted in a similar fashion as it did in Latin America and Eastern Europe, even though the Asian situation was very different; it insisted on fundamental changes in economic and institutional structures as a condition for receiving funds. It applied its traditional mix of fiscal policies (higher taxes, less government spending) and credit tightening (implying higher interest rates). It is a matter of debate whether this mix was applicable to the situation in Asia and did in fact help the countries. As this is not the main subject of our debate here I shall not discuss the matter here. 
The fact of the matter is that the IMF’s role in Thailand an Indonesia went beyond these fiscal policies and credit tightening. It required governments to reform their financial institutions and to make substantial changes in their economic structures and political behaviour (Feldstein, 1998). These reforms might be desirable, but they were in no way necessary to regain the inflow of foreign funds. 
The central question here is whether an international institution should take upon it the role of internally dealing with sovereign countries that seek its help. Is it morally just to have such an impact on a nation’s political process? In a sovereign country it are the legitimate political institutions that determine the nation’s economies structure and the nature for its institutions (Feldstein, 1998). 
According to Feldstein the IMF should ask itself three questions before insisting on a particular reform:
1. Is this reform really needed to restore the country's access to international capital markets? 2. Is this a technical matter that does not interfere unnecessarily with the proper jurisdiction of a sovereign government? 3. If the policies to be changed are also practiced in the major industrial economies of Europe, would the IMF think it appropriate to force similar changes in those countries if they were subject to a fund program? (Feldstein, 1998) All questions should be answered with ‘yes’ before the IMF can really insist. 
This problem of sovereignty is not the only problem when analyzing the very painful and comprehensive reforms. These reforms will make sure countries will avoid calling upon the IMF for help. In order to avoid calling upon the IMF countries will save large foreign reserves, which for developing countries is a shame. Instead of importing products that may help its people, the nation will save the money gained by the trade surplus. 
Finally, several claims have been made that the features of the IMF policy program of Korea were features of policy that the United States and Japan had long wanted Korea to adopt. 
In his book Globalization and its Discontents (2002), Joseph Stiglitz provides reasons why conditionality may not work at all and therefore may not be necessary. First of all, money provided for a certain purpose, frees up money in another area. The money freed up, will be used by the government as it suits the government. Stiglitz also claims that sometimes conditions were simply wrong, and sometimes even politically unsustainable, which can put a country in a difficult position (Stiglitz, 2002: 46).
In sum, it can be said that the new raison d’être the IMF adopted since the debt crisis of the 1980s, goes beyond technical assistance in a time of crisis. It invades a nation’s sovereign territory, which is not always to the benefit of the country. It can act in this manner because the country seeking help is in the weakest position a country may ever find itself in.


2	Brazilian history as the background of the crisis  
In 1998-1999 Brazil suffered from a financial crisis. The recently introduced currency, the Real, collapsed in 1999. The country could not repay its loans and suffered from huge balance of payment difficulties. 
In the next section I shall have a look at the history of Brazil, in particular the economic history. I shall then in depth describe the Real Plan, which was a mayor contributor to the eventual crisis.  
2.1 Brazilian history 
Discovered in 1500 and colonised by Portugal a few decades later, in 1522, the nation of Brazil now consists of 8.514.876 m² of land, containing 188.078.261 people. With its capital, Brasilia, inland, and its largest city, São Paolo, on the coast, Brazil is the largest country in Latin America with a vibrant history. 

Until the 17th century Brazil had a sugar economy. It can be said that Brazil had the sugar monopoly in the world. This changed when after 1700 gold was found in the region of Minas Gerais (general mines). Until 1807 Brazil was a rather closed economy. When in 1807 Napoleon entered Portugal the prince-regent João VI fled to Brazil. In order to maintain its economy the prince-regent decided to open it up. João VI stayed in Brazil even after the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815. He stayed until 1821, when he left his son Pedro to reign. 
Under pressure of the independence-movements in the rest of Latin America, Pedro declared the Independence of Brazil in his Grito de Ipiranga, becoming the first Emperor from 1822-1831. The monarchy lasted until the reign of Emperor Dom Pedro II (1840-1889). In this period the Brazilian economy relied on a variety of products, after the sugar and gold rush had come to an end. 
Although production grew, the population grew even faster, leaving the population with less than before, in spite of the increase in productivity. This problem was solved in 1840 when the so-called coffee-boom began (de Groot, 1991: 23). From 1841 until 1889 stable Brazil developed a thriving export economy, almost exclusively based on its sale of coffee, rubber, sugar and tobacco (Fowler, 2002: 75). Since 1850, under pressure of the rising prices of slaves and the decline in the supply of slaves, the fazendeiros in the North East had started to change their economy. What used to be a thriving export economy had become a self-fulfilling agricultural economy (de Groot, 1991: 41).
By the 1870s increasing numbers of peasants and Portuguese and Italian immigrants started to form an alternative labour force, and under pressure of the British navy, who wanted their colonies on the West-Indies to compete fairly, Princess Isabella abolished slavery without compensation to the slave owners. The following revolt of 15 November 1889 inaugurated the First Republic (1889-1930) (Fowler, 2002: 100).
As coffee prices on the world market dropped substantially, the coffee-valorisation program started in 1906 in São Paolo. The state would buy the coffee at a fixed basic price and would wait with the sale of it on the world market, until the price was higher again. As the price was artificially high, the competition from i.e. Colombia rose. Apart from that, Brazil was kept unilaterally dependent on coffee (de Groot, 1991: 49).  The collapse of the Amazonian rubber boom (1910-1914) made clear that the Brazilian economy was a monoculture overdepending on agricultural exports (Fowler, 2002: 100). In spite of these obstacles, the success of the coffee sector contributed to the industrialisation of Brazil. As wealth grew, capital was used in the 1910s and 1920s to start small factories and European immigrants would import products, which were favored by the other immigrants (de Groot, 1991: 67).
Brazil also experienced several effects from World War I. On the one hand, it became harder to import industrial products from Europe, and trade turned difficult because of the German U-boats near the Brazilian coast. On the other hand, foreign competition ended, which meant that the Brazilian industry had a chance to grow. The export also became more important, because of the demand for war products and agrarian products (de Groot, 1991: 67).
In the 1920s Brazil was left with a high foreign debt and extreme inflation. The 1920s were a decade of political and economic crisis. In the midst of it Vargas came to power in 1930 after a coup in order to settle the crisis. 
After the Economic Depression of 1929 it became clear that Brazil could no longer rely on agricultural products, it had to industrialize. In the 1930s Brazil shifted from a thriving export economy towards ISI, Import-Substituting Industrialisation (cutting imports and letting the country’s own products be produced for the domestic market, in order to stimulate the domestic industry). Monoculture was being replaced by diversity. 
Between 1930-1945 and 1950-1954 Brazil or o Estado Novo (the New State) was led by Gertulio Vargas a dictator of a reformist socialist authoritarian government. Under Vargas, the working day was fixed at 8 hours, an impressive social security system was established, and minimum wages became effective. Under Vargas ISI was started and under his successor Kubitschek the protectionist policies were taken to another level, including high tariffs all financed by foreign investment. 
After the economic crisis of 1962, Goulart pursued basic reforms, but the elite did not cooperate, therefore Goulart decided to go on without the elite. Eventually a coup in March 1964 led to the establishment of a military regime that lasted until 1985. In 1968 the Brazilian Milagre (miracle) began. This miracle lasted until 1974. Under president Geisel (1974-1978) Brazil performed mais o menos (more or less) in spite of some problems. It was under president Figueiredo, when the problems began. 
He introduced Abertura in Brazil, which can be compared to the well-known Glasnost in the Soviet Union a few years later. Turmoil with the working classes was the result, in part caused by stagnation of the economic development of the nation. This brought Brazil onto the verge of collapsing (de Groot, 1991: 174). In 1983-84 it was submitted to the harsh reforms imposed by the IMF. The rise in domestic interest rates caused a flow of bankruptcies and government spending was cut dramatically. The industrial sector suffered the most, but something good came out of it all; thanks to extra efforts in the export sector, the current account balance improved, which in the end led to the economy growing again (de Groot, 1991: 179). The glory came too late for the regime though; on 15 January 1985, Tancredo Neves was chosen as the new president of the Nova Republica (New Republic). 
2.2 Background of the Brazilian crisis 
Unless indicated otherwise section 2.2 is based on Saad-Filho and Molho, 2000.
2.2.1 Indexation 
As described above in 2.1 import-substitution industrialization (ISI) was responsible for the capital accumulation in Brazil between 1930 and 1980. A large manufacturing sector was created in Brazil, producing mainly for the domestic market. This rapid industrialization in Brazil also contributed to labor segmentation. Skilled workers mainly in the region of São Paolo were well-organized and their wages were much higher than the Brazilian median. They could demand these higher wages quite easily, because the large firms could transfer the raise to the prices. 
Indexation of prices and wages to past-inflation was introduced gradually across the economy between the late 1960s and the mid-1990s. First this was done in order to expand the market for the Brazilian government’s own securities. Later on it was used as an income policy which contained the distributive conflicts and shifted them over time. It helped to provide social stability, because citizens expected their losses as a result of inflation today to be compensated for by a raise in income later on. The population did not only benefit from the Plan though; the Gini-coefficient rose in the period from 1970-1989 from 0.54 to 0.69, leaving Brazil, until today, to be one of the most unequal societies in the world. The indexation used in Brazil also made inflation drop rigidly downwards for three reasons: 1. Firms and workers started to adopt prices simply by projecting inflation into the future. By expecting inflation to be 2% prices and wages went up 2% already today, which lead to an even higher inflation due to the prior indexation. 2. In order to protect their profits firms increased their mark-up when inflation was rising or expected to do so. 3. Indexation made the economy highly vulnerable to rising inflation after negative supply shocks. When supply would drop, prices would rise drastically; this inflation would cause prices and wages to rise accordingly, due to the indexation. 
2.2.2 Heterodox shocks
Fiscal and monetary policies were in general ineffective against inflation, because the policies were not the factors that created prices and income, it was past-inflation. By the mid-1980s the main thought in Brazil was that disinflation would require co-ordinated de-indexation of prices and wages. A group of neostructuralist writers were asked to come up with a plan and they did; they developed “heterodox shock” as a policy alternative to the usual monetary and fiscal policy. The idea was to freeze prices and wages at their average real level and at that point abolish indexation. The several heterodox shocks that were attempted were very successful in the beginning and did indeed reduce inflation. In February 1986 the “cruzado plan” reduced inflation 15 percentage point, on a monthly basis, leaving it at 1 percent for several months. In spite of these fabulous results immediately after the imposition, the heterodox shocks would collapse after a few months and inflation rates tended to explode in the aftermath. 
If monetary and fiscal policy was bound to fail and all that was needed was co-ordinated de-indexation, why then did these plans not work? Most importantly, price freeze transforms short-term imbalances in relative prices, created by inflation itself, into permanent differences. When wages have not yet been corrected for inflation and wages and prices are frozen at that point, the price is an inflated price, but not recognized as such, thus leaving the price at its relative high level. This then decreases the level of the real wages, the result being inflation. As can be seen in figure 2.1 the cruzado plan did not avert inflation, the Real Plan, described in the next section did. 
Figure 2.1 Monthly inflation rate, 1986-1999. (Central Bank of Brazil)


The failure of several heterodox programs disorganized relative prices and increased inflationary expectations with social tolerance for high inflation decreasing at the same time. To avert hyperinflation (the flight from currency into commodity) and dollarization** of the society the Brazilian central bank systematically increased interest rates and the liquidity of its securities. High interest rates and high liquidity of securities can make sure people keep their savings in the bank, which enables the bank to keep investing in the economy. 
2.2.3 Extra money 
In the post-war era the Brazilian government generously provided extra money. Initially they did so to support public and private investment programs, and later they kept doing so to preserve the level of activity in spite of crises. 
Extra money can lead to inflation; as people have more money to spend prices go up due to the increase in demand. The high growth rates between 1947 and 1980 show that the policy was successful. The money however did not all come floating in through taxes as a robust tax-system was absent. This meant that fiscal deficits were generally high and in particular in the early 1960s and the late 1970s these deficits caused a growth in domestic public debt. The high interest rates which were used to attract foreign capital, reduce domestic inflation and avoid dollarization as described above also contributed to the high domestic public debt. 
2.2.4 The Real Plan
When the problem of high inflation was not solved by the heterodox shocks, the same group of academics came up with the Real Plan. The Real Plan would de-index the economy and liberalize trade and capital accounts of the balance of payment. In January 1994 the government took the first step; they introduced measures to reduce the fiscal deficit and increased control over government expenditure in order to reduce the fiscal debt. In March 1994, when the inflation-level was rising up to 50 percent per month, the government introduced the URV, Unidade real de valor, linked to the U.S. dollar. The URV was a price-index itself; since it was linked to the dollar the indexation used before was useless. This stabilized real wages and key prices in the economy.
In July 1994, the URV was transformed into the Real, which was set at an exchange rate equal to $1. The policy-makers set interest rates at 8 percent per month to avoid consumption bubbles. The high interest rates, a stable currency, financial liberalization all led to more short-term capital flows. Those capital flows raised the value of the Real to R$ 0.85.
In this manner the Real Plan stopped inflation, dollar wages rose, due to the appreciation of the Real and cheap imported consumer goods became widely available, all financed by foreign capital inflows, as can be seen in figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2 Foreign Direct Investment (1991-1999) (Central Bank of Brazil)


Next to these positive effects of the Real, two problems arose as well: 1. money demand rose, because the currency could be used everywhere as it was widely recognized. In order to avoid higher interest rates and less economic activity this demand had to be satisfied, without leading to extra money inflation. 2. The decline of inflation reduced the interest rate on domestic savings accounts. In order to avoid spending rather than saving and through the extra money inflation, interest rates were raised.
2.2.5 A drop in international capital flows and the bank’s limitations
Mid-1994 the United States raised their interest rates, which led to an immediate outflow of capital from Brazil, which in turn led to the collapse of the Mexican peso. In Brazil, the rapid loss of reserves led to the Brazilian government raising interest rates to nearly 50 percent. In a perfectly sound economic system an outflow of capital would lead to a depreciation of the currency as demand drops. The Real was fixed to the dollar though. Initially Brazil responded by introducing a flexible exchange rate band between R$ 0.86 and R$ 0.90. In the end Brazil opted for the adoption of a crawling peg. This means the peg value is changed often according to a set of indicators or according to the judgment of the government (Pugel, 2002: 483). In effect this meant that the Real devalued by 7.5% per year against the dollar (The Economist, The Devaluing of a Presidency, 1999). 
By fixing the Real to the dollar the central bank and the commercial banking system’s ability to create money was lost, as this would in reality depreciate the value of the Real to the dollar. The overvaluation did on the other hand control inflation, as did trade liberalization. The controlling of inflation was one of the key aspects of the Real plan important to maintain social consent. Other factors as less unemployment and rising dollar wages increased the purchasing power of wage earners. The Brazilian people were therefore satisfied with the Real Plan. 
The prosperity that followed from the Real Plan was an important factor that increased the need to support the program. This need and the limitations imposed on the banking system implied that the domestic interest rate had to be much higher than the foreign interest rates. As the Brazilian people were importing cheap consumer products, caused by the overvaluating of the Real, the balance of payment had to be straightened by capital inflow from abroad. In order to attract this capital interest rates had to be high. 
2.2.6 The rise of domestic debt





Figure 2.3 Net domestic debt 1982-1998 % of GDP (Central Bank of Brazil) 


After 1996 rising trade and current account deficits, increasing unemployment, and the concentration of income all led to a drop in the people’s support for the Real Plan. Confidence dropped not only internally, but internationally as well, leading to a reversion of capital flows.
The international crises that hit other nations in the 1990s, i.e. the Mexican crisis 1994, the Asian crisis 1997 and the Russian crisis 1998 meant a serious drop in Brazilian reserves. In order to control this drop, interest rates were raised even more to keep attracting capital inflow. 
2.2.7 The downward fiscal spiral of 1994-1998
Growth of domestic demand was accompanied by a less significant rise in domestic production. This development led to increases in prices of non-traded goods and in the demand for foreign goods. This in turn led to current account deficits, as the amount imported was higher than the amount exported. Fiscal expenditure grew by 31 percent. Interest payment on public debt increased by 108 percent. Transfers to municipalities grew by 17 percent. Real government expenditure rose by 8 percent in 1997 and 22 percent in 1998. In the meantime, real GDP only grew by 10.7 percent. 
To solve this problem of the current account deficit and government spending, interest rates were subject to large increases. In short, Brazil’s fiscal position weakened substantially, partly owing to large increases in public sector wages, public sector price freezes, and the loss of control mechanisms that had previously relied on high inflation to erode the real value of budgeted expenditures (Independent Evaluation Report, 2003).
According to Krugman, as described by Ferreira and Tullio (2000), fiscal deficits and current account deficits are highly correlated. A budget deficit results in a reduction in national savings relative to investment demand and thus to a rise in the real interest rate. This high interest rate, to make domestic assets attractive to foreign investors, leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency. Now the domestic production is more expensive than abroad. The result is that imports rise and exports fall, which leads to an external deficit. The budget deficit then leads to an external deficit, the real appreciation of the currency functioning as a transmission mechanism. 
Whether or not the relationship between the Real plan and the fiscal deficits is causal, the facts remain that the mix of loose fiscal policy and tight monetary policies to defend the exchange rate led to a rapid expansion of public debt to GDP. The policy mix in Brazil had two major implications: 1. The public sector debt increased due to the high interest rates, despite moderate growth, from 30.0 percent in December 1994 to 34.4 percent of GDP in December 1996. 2. Overvaluation of the Real; some estimated that the Real appreciated in effective terms by 33 percent between June 1994 and February 1995. 
Under the circumstances of the storm in the global economy mid-1997 and the presidential elections of October 1998, the options for the Brazilian government to address these problems were limited. 






3	The Brazilian crisis and the IMF 
As discussed in chapter 2 the government imposed the Real Plan, with the goal of cutting inflation, mainly caused by indexation. The overvalued Real, fixed to the dollar made high interest rates inevitable. The high interest rates increased the Brazilian domestic debt, which was already high on account of money supply in the post-war era. These difficulties as a result of choice by the government contributed to the speculative attacks suffered by the Real, and to the loss of reserves which led to the currency crash of January 1999. Figure 3.1 illustrates how the Real crashed in January 1999.

Figure 3.1 Nominal exchange rate ($/R$) (Central Bank of Brazil)


In the next sections I shall discuss what happened in the Brazilian economy, right before and immediately after the currency crash. Next to the situation in Brazil I shall discuss the answer provided by the IMF. 
3.1 Brazil before November 1998
The Real Plan was a success in terms of controlling the inflation that had troubled the Brazilian economy for so long. It did no good, however, to the fiscal deficit: in 1998 the deficit was estimated at 8% of GDP. Neither was the Real Plan good for the external current account, which rose to 4.5% of GDP in 1998. These two deficits contributed to the widespread sentiment that the crawling peg would not hold (IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1999).
Not just the two deficits caused investors to pull out their money. The Russian crisis had its impact as well. The contagion from the Russian crisis in August 1998, caused investors to reassess their risks in the emerging markets. In August investors pulled out $ 12 billion, and in September $ 19 billion. Neither the announcement of several fiscal measures, nor the interest rates of 43% could soothe the markets (IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1999).
3.2 The IMF before November 1998: surveillance
IMF surveillance effectively diagnosed the major vulnerabilities in Brazil, largely because Brazil’s vulnerabilities manifested themselves primarily as macro-economic phenomena, such as the rising stock of public debt and real exchange rate appreciation, which were part of the IMF’s traditional tool kit (Fereirra and Tullio, 2000). The following section will describe the IMF’s role in Brazil before 1998. Unless indicated otherwise, the remainder of section 3.2 is based on the Evaluation Report by the International Evaluation Office of the IMF, 2003. 
Exchange rate policy
While it was generally agreed that the Real was in fact overvalued, nobody could establish with certainty the extent of the overvaluation. In the end staff believed that the exchange rate was overvalued by 15-20 percent. Some say now, that because of this overvaluation the IMF should have encouraged an earlier exit from the crawling peg regime at an opportune moment. However, the IMF had its hands tied; it had to take the exchange rate regime preferred by the authorities as given and starting from that it had to ensure that other macroeconomic policies were consistent with it. The IMF did indeed favour a gradual exchange rate adjustment, although this preference only resulted in a policy advice for Brazil to accelerate the rate of depreciation within the de facto crawling system. 
Fiscal policy










With little foreign exchange risk and little systemic exposure to credit risks the Brazilian banking system was assessed as sound. 
Short-term debt
In 1998 it became clear – for reasons that will not be discussed in this section – that certain sources of capital might not have been adequately reflected in official short-term debt figures. The result in retrospect was that the stock of short-term debt was being underestimated at the time.
Impact of surveillance
As described above the information available to the IMF was substantial. Although surveillance is one of the means to achieve the core end of the IMF, viz crisis-prevention, it had not succeeded in the matter. Three reasons can be given to explain why this was the case. 1. A lack of effective dialogue between the IMF and the Brazilian authorities. This can be dated back to the fact that the IMF did not back the Real Plan with a program, but let the Brazilian government sort it out themselves. 2. A lack of transparency; little of the IMF’s analysis of development was made public. The result was that an open discussion was not possible. 3. The buoyant international capital market conditions between mid-1995 and late 1997. Even with the existing concerns private lenders and investors were more than willing to finance the large budget deficit run by the Brazilian government. 
3.3 The IMF’s program of November 1998
Charles Krause, a journalist for the Online Newshour of Jim Lehrer, claims that after the Asian Crisis had spread to Russia the IMF decided that, ‘if the crisis was to be stopped, it would have to be stopped in Brazil’ (Krause, Online Newshour, 1999). The comparison between the total rescue packages of the Asian crisis and the Russian, as seen below in figure 3.3, shows that this was probably the idea behind the rescue package for Brazil. In Washington they were designing a package that would be credible and at the same time would not do any damage to the newly elected president Hernando Enrique Cardoso, as he was seen as a strong and capable leader (Krause, Online Newshour, 1999).
On October 8th Brazil and the IMF issued a joint statement presenting the broad goals of economic policy, goals both parties supported (The Economist, A Deal at Last, 1999).

Figure 3.3 comparison of rescue packages (The Economist, Flaying the Fund, 1999)
	IMF contributions $bn	Total rescue package $ bn	GDP % change 1998
Russia Jul 1996	21.2	21.2	-5.0
Indonesia Nov 1997	11.2	42.3	-14.8




Unless indicated otherwise the remainder of section 3.3 is based on the Evaluation Report by the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF, 2003.
Exchange rate policy
An important component of the program, designed by the IMF, to help Brazil with its balance of payment difficulties, was the decision to proceed without substantial modifications to the exchange rate system. As described above, it was the exchange rate regime preferred by the Brazilian authorities and it was the IMF’s duty to treat the regime as given. For this reason the program did not specify any change in the rate of crawl. The unstable global market conditions in August-December 1998 also had an impact on the decision to stick with the exchange rate. The three main aspects that had an impact on the decision were: 1. In such circumstances the exit from the peg may lead to overshooting (see box 3.1 below) and the return of high inflation. 2. In the context of the Russian crisis and the concerns about the Long-Term Capital Management problems, the maintenance became an image of stability. 3. The exit could have a contagious effect, particularly on Argentina.
Fiscal policy
This was the key issue of the program. It was connected to the sustainability of Brazil’s public debt, which was the main objective of the 1998 program. In effect this meant that the objective was to stabilize the ratio of the net public debt to GDP at 47 percent in the calendar year 2000, declining thereafter (Independent Evaluation Office, 2003). 
Box 3.1 Exchange rate overshooting (Pugel, 2002: 378) 
 
Monetary policy
In the initial program the monetary policy was primarily supportive of exchange rate policy. This was to be expected, because the IMF must support the nation’s choice in exchange rate system, Several ‘ceilings’ were marked for the net domestic assets as well as for the net international reserves. 
Structural measures
Conditionality was limited to macro-critical areas and the policy measures taken were almost entirely drawn from the authorities’ existing policy agenda. The program comprised a range of structural measures: structural tax reform, labor market reform, social security and pension reform, improvements in financial sector regulation and most importantly the Fiscal Responsibility Law.
The FRL, or LRF (Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal), was to play an important role in achieving the program’s target for primary fiscal surpluses. It placed tight limits on borrowing by states and municipalities. Next to that it forbade them to spend more than a certain amount of their revenues on wages, viz 60%. The penalty for governors and mayors breaking the new law was loss of federal funds, criminal charges and perhaps even prison. The law also forbade bail-out by the federal government. When a city or state was in financial trouble the federal government would not come to the rescue (The Economist, Process and Pitfalls in Brazil’s Public Finance, 1999). In short, the FRL established a general framework to guide budgetary planning and execution (Independent Evaluation Office, 2003) The law was approved in May 2000.
3.4 Brazil November – January 15th
In December 1998 Brazil suffered another enormous outflow of capital; there had been strong resistance against the so badly needed social security reforms. At the beginning of January one of Brazil’s largest states declared a moratorium on debts owed to the central government. Other states soon joined the request (IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1999).
Then, ‘less than a fortnight into a second term as Brazil’s president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso took the most traumatic decision of his political career in circumstances of high farce. Speaking on a mobile phone from a public lavatory at Rio de Janeiro’s international airport, where he had taken refuge from the media, Mr Cardoso on January 12th ordered his finance minister to prepare to devalue the real the next morning.’ (The Economist, The Devaluing of a Presidency, 1999). On January 12th $ 12 billion left the country, which led to the widening of the band from 1.12-1.22 to 1.20-1.32, depreciating the Real by almost 7.5% (IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1999). On January 15th the Real was left to float, leading to another depreciation of 16%. 
3.5 Brazil after the currency crash
Short term decisions
At this point the Brazilian authorities were faced with a dilemma. On the one hand a depreciation of a floating Real, could lead to higher inflation, a troublesome matter which was the incentive for the Brazilian government to peg its currency in the first place. On the other hand, if the currency was to be defended and stabilised, high interest rates would have to do the trick, burdening the government’s domestic debts, which in time might become insupportable (The Economist, After Brazil, 1999).
After the currency crash several fears were weighing the currency down. An important fear of investors was a relapse into chronic inflation. Although imports only accounted for 7% of GDP, and deep recession was an inevitable consequence of the crisis, the impact of prices on devaluation ought to have been limited (The Economist, Downdraught, 1999). According to The Economist Brazil needed to replace its buckled exchange-rate anchor wit a rigid fiscal one. The Economist recognized though that politics remain a threat to fiscal reform. For the time being interest rates had to be left sky high (The Economist, Tempest-tossed but floating, 1999). How fast Brazil would recover according to The Economist depended on how quickly fiscal discipline substituted for these punitive interest rates. Box 3.2 describes the effects of fiscal contraction with floating exchange rates. Congress would not be easily convinced though. Due to the crisis the support for President Cardoso would be weaker, which would only make the fiscal reform harder to push through (The Economist, Tempest-tossed but floating, 1999). 
Mary Bush, former IMF executive board member stated that ‘the good news is that the medium and longer term effects of governments spending cuts will be good for growth. First, these cuts will help slow down the growth of public sector debt. Second, lower public sector debt spending will release some room for additional credit for private sector needs. Third, the spending cuts will help bring down the interest burden’ (Bush, Online Newshour, 1999).

Box 3.2 Fiscal contraction with floating exchange rates (Pugel, 2004: 626) 


3.6 The revised program of March 1999
In February the currency market had broadly been stabilized, but by the end of February and at the beginning of March new pressure arose, which led to a further increase in interest rates. Confidence returned with the approval of the IMF reforms and the exchange rate was stabilized at $ 1.73 for a Real (IMF, World Economist Outlook, 1999).
Unless indicated otherwise the remainder of 3.6 is based on the Evalutation Report by the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF, 2003.
Exchange rate policy
In spite of the fact that the IMF never truly supported the pegged exchange under the given circumstances, a change in the exchange rate regime was nowhere to be found in the initial program. As many may have expected though it did not last long. On January 15th, 1999, the exchange rate was allowed to float freely, and the floating exchange rate was from then on supported by the IMF.
Fiscal policy
The revised program in March 1999 reaffirmed the need for fiscal reform to ensure debt-sustainability. After the events of January 1999, when the Real was allowed to float freely, this debt had been substantially boosted and went from 42.6 percent GDP at end-1998 to 52.2 percent in February 1999. This boost did lead to minor changes in the percentage point of the target for primary surplus. 
Monetary policy
For the medium-term an inflation-targeting framework was adopted. Ceilings were adopted for certain macro-economic and fiscal policies. These policies were constrained though by the ceilings in order to combat inflation. 
Structural measures
Although the authorities’ agenda on structural reform was unchanged, the formal structural conditionality was limited in the revised program. The most important element being that the Fiscal Responsibility Law remained in effect. 
3.7 Brazil after the currency crisis
Long term results
With regard to long term results we find that in January, after the currency crash, Brazil’s Congress at last got the courage to approve some of the overdue reforms. One of these was increasing the pension contributions paid by the public-sector workers with higher wages; the other was deducting contributions from the pensions of those already retired (The Economist, Nuts in Brazil, 1999). This contributed to reaching the several ceilings, i.e. on deficits. 
According to Stephen Radelet: ‘Brazil has made remarkable progress during the last decade by implementing wide-ranging reforms including the liberalization of foreign trade and investment rules, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and a strengthening of the financial sector. With appropriate macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, careful strengthening of financial systems, and a focus on integrating its manufacturing firms with the global trading system, Brazil has the potential to grow rapidly during the next decade and raise standards of living for a broader segment of the population’ (Radelet, Online Newshour, 1999). 
Some facts: Real GDP grew by 0.8 percent in 1999; consumer price indexed inflation was only 4.8 percent, far less than the projected 8.6! A more disciplined fiscal regime and a new monetary regime based on inflation targeting were established. Not all results are as rosy as suggested above though. The public debt was composed in such a way that it was vulnerable to exchange rate and interest rate risks. Apart from the debt being vulnerable, Brazil remained vulnerable to external and domestic shocks, which also affected market sentiment (Independent Evaluation Office, 2003).
On June 12th 1999 president Cardoso suggested that the next slice from the IMF bail-out might not even be needed. In the three months leading up to March, the government had managed a primary surplus of 9.2 billion Reais, whereas only 6 billion was targeted by the IMF. Ironically, this success was partially due to 1.4 billion Reais in taxes from investors who had gambled successfully on the devaluation (The Economist, Matters of Tax, 1999).
3.7.1 The overall picture of Brazil’s recovery 
In the next section I shall give a graphic description of Brazil’s recovery. The macro-economic indicators inflation, unemployment and growth will be discussed. As described above the interest rates played and important role in Brazil’s crisis and its recovery, especially with regard to combating inflation. Therefore also the interest rates will be described and discussed. 


Inflation and interest rates

Figure 3.4 Inflation in Brazil (World Bank, WDI)


Figure 3.4 above shows that directly after the crisis hyperinflation did not occur. There was inflation, but not substantially more than before the currency crash. 
















In figure 3.5 it can be seen that the interest rates before the crisis hit were sky high. This did no good, as this did not restore confidence and the currency crashed anyway. Until the fiscal reforms were pushed through Congress in May 2000 the interest rates were still high. As expected and predicted immediately after the crisis, as soon as the fiscal reforms were pushed through, the interest rates were no longer needed to combat inflation and the rates could drop again.
Unemployment in Brazil





















Figure 3.7, giving the annual growth of the economy as a percentage of GDP, completes the overall picture of Brazil. 

Figure 3.7 Growth in Brazil (UN, UNstats) 
 

Right before the currency crash, in 1998, there was nearly zero growth (0.1%). The economy had become completely stagnant. In the year immediately following the crisis, 1999, there were signs of a little growth, but still not as much as Brazil had known before the crisis. Then, in the year 2000 Brazilian growth was impressive, and recorded about 4.3%. As said before this was the easy part; the harder part as evident from the figure, was still to come with growth declining to 1.3% of GDP. Only after 2003 was Brazil fully recovered from the crisis and ready for the title ‘today’s emerging market’. 

In sum, it can be said that the macro-economic indicators mainly show the expected results. Inflation rose at an easy pace as it had done before. This was probably due to the high interest rates that lasted until the implementation of the Fiscal Responsibility Law, when the interest rates as a means against higher inflation were replaced by a steady fiscal policy. Unemployment rates and growth were up and down until 2003. From 2003 the Brazilian economy was growing again, one can say that by then the Brazilian economy had fully recovered from the crash.
 
4	Discussion
In the preceding chapters I discussed the monetary crisis in Brazil and the role of the IMF in attempts at averting and/or repairing the crisis. Chapter 1 contains an analysis of the development of the IMF and its difficulties with regard to interest rates, intervening techniques and new raison d’être. Chapter 2 describes in length the Brazilian history moving towards an insupportable situation and eventually, as described in chapter 3, the currency crash. Chapter 3 also contains a lengthy description of the IMF’s rescue package. The three subjects of controversy, as described in chapter 1, can be checked against the IMF’s policies in the context of the Brazilian financial crisis.
In order to answer the question  whether the IMF had learned its lessons from the criticisms expressed after the Asian crisis and dealt with above in 1.4, all three subjects of criticism will be applied separately to the Brazilian case. This means that the following three questions must be asked: 1. Was the IMF right in raising interest rates? 2. Was the presence of the IMF a means to achieve the end and resolve the crisis? 3. Did the IMF go too far in its intervention of a sovereign country?
4.1 Raising interest rates
The answer as provided by the IMF comprised once again increases in the interest rate. Although it can be claimed, that the IMF had a different opinion about the choice for an exchange rate regime, this cannot be an excuse for a bad policy. The IMF defended an exchange rate it never believed in, The core of the question should be: Was the IMF right in its defence of the exchange rate regime? According to Krugman (1999) the Brazilian case was yet another example that interest rates do not defend the exchange rate and do not prevent currency crises. The raise in the interest rate in fact triggered the crisis (Krugman, 1999: 66). 
Not only can it be claimed that the crisis was triggered by the raises in interest rates, it is also the case, according to Michel Chossudovsky (1999), a professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa, that the IMF intentionally postponed the inevitable, the currency crash. Already in July 1998, Washington had explicitly instructed the Brazilian authorities not to ‘tamper with the rules governing the multi-billion dollar futures and options trade on the Sao Paolo exchange. Even when in October the capital flight was reaching $ 400 million per day, the Brazilians were not to initiate exchange rate controls. In the end, during the 6-7 months following the beginning of the increase in capital flight triggered by the Russian crisis and the insupportable Real Plan, as described above, $ 50 billion left Brazil, leaving the Brazilian banks with no foreign currency reserves (Chossudovsky, 1999). According to Chossudovsky (1999), Washington bought time for investors to pull out their money while they still could. This money, confiscated through capital flight, was lent back to Brazil in the shape of the IMF rescue package.  Michel Chossudovsky states that instead of restoring confidence in the Brazilian economy in order to keep investors from pulling out their money, the IMF  was really sponsoring a rescue operation that contributed to the acceleration of the capital flight (Chossudovsky, 1999).  Ironically, the amount of money considered by the IMF was exactly equal to the amount of money that had left the country in the form of capital flight, $ 30 billion (Chossudovsky, 1998).
The evidence found strengthens the case against the IMF policy of raising interest rates in order to prevent a crisis. Whether with the objective of  buying time for investors or without a hidden agenda, the rise in interest rates surely did not prevent the crisis. Brazil once again has shown that it may not be a universal rule that higher interest rates lead to a stable exchange rate. 
4.2 Means and ends
Asking the question whether the IMF is in general the solution to a crisis – telling the investors that the problem is structural – is a difficult question to answer. As shown above, raising interest rates, either with or without a hidden agenda definitely did not contribute to restoring the confidence of the investors. With regard to raising interest rates means and ends did not coincide. What about the second part of 1.4; was the IMF the institution to restore confidence or was the presence of the IMF an incentive for investors to pull their money out? 
Chossudovsky (1999) states that the Brazilian rescue package, that was in fact arranged before the actual crash, was definitely an omen for investors, that the IMF was preventing the occurrence of a financial disaster!  ‘Twenty billion dollars were taken out of the country in the two months following the approval of the IMF precautionary package: an amount of money of the same order of magnitude as the massive ‘up-front’ budget cuts required by the IMF’ (Chossudovsky, 1999). 
According to Brett D. Schaefer and John P. Sweeney (1999) the eventual crash of the currency was caused by four main factors: 1. When governor Itamar France of Minas Gerais declared his moratorium, investors quickly lost confidence in Brazil’s ability to meet its obligations. 2. The reforms announced by President Cardoso attacked the system of constitutionally protected state governors, a situation much enjoyed by the governors in question, who happened to be the members of Congress deciding which laws would pass and which would not. 3. Faced with this strong opposition and the IMF package that made the reforms seem less urgent, President Cardoso was not capable to exercise the leadership needed for the necessary reforms. 4. The initial $ 9 billion disbursed by the IMF, alleviated the urgency for the reforms (Steafer and Sweeney, 1999).
This shows that the presence of the IMF and the policies the IMF provided did indeed contribute to the situation becoming graver every day. Raising interest rates as a sign that there is something wrong, letting the world know through its sheer presence that something is definitely wrong, letting the Brazilian Congress get away with not pushing through the necessary reforms, these are all reasons why it seems a fair and reasonable criticism, that the IMF’s means and ends did not coincide. 
4.3 Intervening in a sovereign country
About the question whether the IMF intervened too much in the sovereign spheres of Brazil one can never be sure. As the minister of finance in Brazil at the time of the crisis let us believe, the policies used to get Brazil back on track were the result of a mutual agreement between Washington and Brasilia (Fraga, 2000). One can never say with certainty that the conditions attached to the ‘rescue-package’ were nòt the result of a mutual agreement between two equal partners. Leaving this point of discussion aside what can be said about the conditions of the IMF and the outcomes of these?
4.3.1 The IMF’s conditions
First of all, in comparison with the structural measures and conditions imposed during the Asian crisis, the IMF had definitely changed its course. The program the IMF and Brasilia agreed upon contained few conditions, and structural measures that can be seen as interventions in a sovereign country. Several ceilings and other fiscal and monetary policy reforms were imposed though and one can argue that these measures may also intervene in a nation’s sovereignty. I shall therefore focus on the core condition as presented in the program, the Fiscal Responsibility Law. This law provides a general framework to guide budgetary planning and execution. Apart from FRL I shall also discuss the manner in which the IMF’s program dealt with combating inflation, an important ceiling in the IMF’s program with internal consequences for Brazil. 
4.3.2 Fiscal Responsibility Law
It took about a year for the Fiscal Responsibility Law to be accepted by Congress in May 2000. According to David Samuels (2003) the federal governments did not take action against it, because they had their fiscal problems resolved by 1999 and through the FRL clarified the conditions under which salaries and civil service jobs could be cut back became clear. In this manner the blame would not be on the federal governments but on the FRL. Since the implementation of the Fiscal Responsibility Law ‘top-down coordination in intergovernmental fiscal relations has been preferred to more horizontal, collegial form of multi-level fiscal policymaking’ (Afonso and Mello, 2000). The state had regained control over the fiscal policy. As Mendes explains: for a structural adjustment to come about credibility and political enduration are essential. Taken the great number of opposite interests involved in a fiscal reform, it is essential that the federal government backs up the reform. ‘There can be no stable fiscal regime, if the government does not give the example’ (Mendes, 1999). 
Although the Law did not explicitly say in which areas budget cutting had to take place, one can argue that the only area in which this could take place is the public area. According to Duncan Green (2000) the consequences of these conditions, wrapped in the package of the Fiscal Responsibility Law, which was in turn wrapped in the package of $ 41.5 billion of rescue funds, was to start with a government cut of $ 25 million in the amount allocated for food rations for the poor in 1999, a cut of more than half the amount allocated in 1998. To meet the condition the IMF proposed the government to also make cuts in the subsidies for school lunches. This cut comprised 35%. 43% of the land reform budget was cut and the bolsa escola program (school scholarships) was cut in half. These measures were not invented or imposed directly by the IMF and the IMF did specifically write ‘to spare as much as possible spending on health, education and social protection’ in its letter of intent (LOI 1999). When budgetary cuts have to be implemented, though, the public sphere is the target as it is (almost) the only way to cut government spending. 
On the other hand, as can be seen in figures 4.1 and 4.2 below, government spending did not drop dramatically at all, and priorities were not shifted away from health, education and social protection. These disparities can be explained by the indexes used. As can be seen, the public spending as shown in figure 4.1  below is in Reais. The value of the Real dropped dramatically from 1998 to 1999,  more or less by 50%. Taking this into account public spending did indeed drop dramatically and so did public spending on health, education and social protection. Figure 4.2, however, showing the percentage of public spending per sector, confirms that priorities were not shifted away from health, education and social protection. This raises the question whether the reforms imposed, in mutual agreement or not, were to blame for the cuts in the areas mentioned by Green or was it perhaps the economic crisis itself that triggered the drop? One can therefore conclude that the Fiscal Responsibility Law, a part of the IMF’s program, may not have been to blame for the drop in spending in the areas of health, education and social protection. 

Figure 4.1 Public spending in total and per sector (IBGE)

Figure 4.2 Percentage of public spending per sector (IBGE)

4.3.3 Inflation 
The devaluation had triggered an inflationary spiral leading to the impoverishment of all sectors of the Brazilian population including the middle classes. As deindexation was used to combat inflation, the government had an excuse for the high rates of unemployment measured directly after the crash. The IMF felt that increased wages were the main cause of inflation, thus justifying the whole process. Rather than addressing the real causes of inflation (the fiscal and monetary policies with the fixed exchange rate before and with the floating exchange rate at the time) the IMF’s program constituted a coherent framework for rapidly laying off workers and compressing wages (Chossudovsky, 1999).
As Venkitaramanan, an economic reporter for the Hindu Business Line stated ‘the austerity package may work, but it can also create conditions of deprivation and lead to political problems for the government. (...) The IMF can impose conditions, which can deteriorate into too detailed an intervention without caring  about the political context’ (Venkitaramanan, 1999).
In sum, Chossudovsky and Venkitaramanan both stated that the IMF imposed ceilings and – indirectly – policy reforms and did not bear responsibility for the consequences. It intervened in a sovereign nation, without caring about the internal affairs of the nation. 
4.3.4 The IMF’s intervention 
Answering the question whether the IMF went too far in its intervention of a sovereign country, three specific questions remain:
1. Was there no other way to meet the fiscal target and regain debt-sustainability? 2. Should the Fund really be carrying out structural reform simultaneously with the currency stabilization? (Feldstein, 1998, see section 1.4.3 above) 3. Are the consequences of such reforms, although indirectly influenced by the IMF, not in fact the actual consequence of the crisis itself? 
The first two questions posed are the most difficult to answer. Maybe there was another way to meet the fiscal target and regain debt-sustainability. No data can really give an answer to this question, unless we are given the opportunity to do it all over again. The fact that the Fiscal Responsibility Law was implemented reasonably fast by Congress at least shows it was generally seen as a reasonable reform. This is the same feeling Fraga (Fraga, 2000) gives us. The fiscal targets were met and debt-sustainability was regained.
With regard to the second question – should structural reform coincide with currency stabilisation – it might indeed have been better if the Fund had waited with structural reform and had not imposed the reform simultaneously with the currency stabilization. Maybe investors would have regained their confidence in the Brazilian economy faster if the IMF ambulance had not been on the doorstep telling them the disease was structural. As shown above there is support for the theory that the IMF can sometimes serve as an early warning for investors to pull out their money rapidly, because something is structurally wrong (section 4.1.2) 
However, the macro-economic indicators show us that inflation did not rise enormously. Most targets were met and the Brazilian economy recovered. This indicates that the measure taken by the IMF might have really been necessary, but the question remains whether the IMF could not have waited. In sum, there are some reasons in favor and some reasons against; support for both has been provided.  
Whether the consequences were not directly influenced by the crisis itself, is in part cleared up by figures 4.1 and 4.2. The sectors health, education and social protection remained prioritized sectors and the percentage of public expenditure for these had not dropped since the crisis. The real value of public expenditure has though, due to the currency crash. Was it really the responsibility of the IMF to keep the public expenditure at the same level as before, implying an enormous increase in percentage of GDP spent in the public sector? Maybe the only thing that could have saved the sectors was the non-existence of the currency crisis. 


Conclusion and suggestions for further research
It is not universally accepted that the IMF always has the compatible answer to a crisis, and is the perfect manager of the world’s financial economy. There is a lot of criticism of the institution. In this thesis I have tried to answer the question whether the IMF had a compatible answer to the Brazilian crisis in 1999.

Examples were given supporting the theory that interest rates do not defend the exchange rate. In answering the question whether the IMF was the right institution to solve the problem, counter evidence to this was found; the IMF can serve as an early warning for investors, which makes them pull out their money even faster, accelerating or even triggering the crisis. 
In answering the question whether the IMF intervened too much in Brazil, a sovereign nation, several answers can be given. I found that the answer as presented by the IMF did not contain much conditionality except for the Fiscal Responsibility Law. On the one hand it can be said that through this policy the poorest in the country were affected, and without the IMF other policies might have been chosen. On the other hand, the presented numbers show that the crisis itself might have been the true reason why the poor were affected. The policies the IMF introduced to control inflation had a political impact the IMF neglected. This shows, that they did not feel responsible and did not respect the sovereign country’s political content.
In sum, most criticisms of the IMF have been supported by the case of the Brazilian crisis and the role of the IMF in it. The IMF did show more respect for the sovereignty of the country than it had done before, as the Independent Evaluation Report of the IMF also claims (Independent Evaluation Office, 2003). It had learned form its mistakes in Asia, but it could still do better.  

With regard to the three questions posed – interest rates, the presence of the IMF and intervening in a sovereign country – a lot remains unanswered. It will be interesting to research those areas further. With regard to the raising of the interest rate and the presence of the IMF, research may be done amongst the investors who at the time, decided to pull out their money. Why were these decisions made and how did they come about. Maybe, in other countries, cases can be found in which the interest rates were not raised so dramatically. One can also investigate policies of investors in such circumstances who may have taken a different course and did not withdraw their money . Why did they stay in and how did that decision come about. 
Considering the intervention in a sovereign country research can be done in the economic and political area. How much influence did the agreement with the IMF have on the policies chosen by the government? To clarify this, studies into the process of policy-making in Brazil might be useful. 
According to Charles Krause (Online Newshour, 1999) the crises that were spreading worldwide had to be stopped in Brazil, which is one explanation for the magnitude of the bail-out. It may therefore also be interesting to see, what the effects of the Brazilian crisis were with respect to the surrounding Latin American countries. Was a crisis avoided there or, were the effects minor, or did many more Latin American countries suffer through the Brazilian crisis? As Brazil today is known as one of the emerging markets, it may be interesting to see whether the crisis itself and the reforms imposed by the IMF have contributed to the current growth in Brazil. 
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K = capital, W = Wealth

In the figure shown above the world is divided into two large countries; Japan and the United States. The horizontal axis shows the wealth of the world equal to Japan’s wealth plus the wealth of the US. The vertical axis shows the rates of return earned on capital investment. Capital investment opportunities in Japan are shown as the marginal-product-of-capital curve; MPK(Japan). Investment opportunities in the US are subsequently shown as the marginal-product-of-capital curve; MPK(US).

In a situation in which international financial transactions are prohibited competition in Japan forces Japanese lenders to accept the low rate of return of 2 percent per year at point R. The same forces force American lenders to accept the high rate of return of 8 percent per year at point S. With no international lending the world’s product equals the shaded area.

In a situation in which international financial transactions are allowed wealth holders in Japan and borrowers in the US have a strong incentive to get together as the Japanese lender will receive a higher rate of return and the borrowers from the US will have to pay a lower interest rate. This will lead to more capital formation in the US and less capital formation in Japan. A new equilibrium is found at let’s say 5 percent worldwide. 

In this new situation Japan gains through its new income consisting of 1. domestic production; the area below MPK(Japan) down to point T. 2. Foreign source income on its investment in the US, area a + b + c + g + h. Japan gains area a + b +c.


























revenue $1.50 – interest = $1,40

In the long run





Current account balance improves

Real spending, production and income fall.
























The drop in government spending means a smaller budget deficit. As foreign investment is no longer necessary to finance the deficit, interest rates drop, which implies an outflow of capital. The little government spending means, less real spending, production and income, this drop in spending improves the current account balance as imports drop.  In the long run prices may even decrease as a result of the drop in demand. 
As you can see, fiscal contraction worsens the overall payment balance in the short run, as shown in the upper half of the diagram, and the short-run is crucial to countries being hit by the withdrawal of foreign credits.  


What happens when the exchange rate is expected to rise by 10 %?
(1)	Prices are sticky and do not change, exports will not rise.
(2)	Domestic interest rate drops, because of the ‘increase in money’ 
(3)	As interest rates drop and the exchange rate will rise, foreign-currency assets are favored. 
(4)	As foreign-currency assets are favored, the exchange rate rises even more than 10%. 
(5)	After the current spot rate overshoots, the overall return on foreign investments also becomes lower.
(6)	The exchange rate slowly establishes at the (as predicted before) 10% increase. 

Our currency may depreciate at first, but it probably appreciates eventually.

Spending and income may rise much at first, but will probably eventually rise less.

In the long run





Current account balance improves























The drop in government spending means a smaller budget deficit. As foreign investment is no longer necessary to finance the deficit, interest rates drop, which implies an outflow of capital. The little government spending means, less real spending, production and income, this drop in spending improves the current account balance as imports drop. In the long run prices may even decrease as a result of the drop in demand. 
As you can see, fiscal contraction depreciates the currency at first as capital flows out. But as imports drop in the end, as a result of the decrease in price level, the currency will appreciate again. this is how the fiscal contraction can ‘defend’ the currency. 
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